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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Fang Liufang's Article' (Fang's Article) purports to be
a comprehensive description of the present legal structure of the
corporatization process of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as endorsed
or acquiesced by the Chinese government since 1984. Fang's Article
succeeds in accomplishing its objective to some extent, largely as a
result of the author's judiciousness and thoroughness. However, the
Article's arguments are not compelling because the large majority of
them contain no basis in reality and have no practical application.
My Article is not intended to generally commend the successful-
ness of Fang's Article in dealing with the formidable task of trying to
provide a thorough analysis of the legal structure of China's corpora-
tization process. Nor does the following purport to be an overall
critique of the inadequacies or misunderstandings contained in the
Article. Rather, I have concentrated on the few issues where I fear
that lack of qualification might generate excessive confusion and
misconceptions concerning China's corporatization framework.
Having been a participant in the creation of this framework, I would
like to take this opportunity to point out that some of the issues
which may seem problematic to the observer are, in fact, useful for
the practitioner. In addition, the measures were adopted in an effort
to insure the continued and successful development of the corporatiz-
ation process.
Throughout Fang's Article, the quixotic, irrational, stubborn,
bureaucratic, and autocratic designer of China's present corporate
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legal system looms large in the background. This perceived unreason-
able person set out from the very beginning to formulate a corporate
system for China that is, as is frequently portrayed by Fang's Article,
unworkable, unenforceable, unpredictable, paternalistic, and self-
perpetuating.
It is apparent, when one peruses the section of Fang's Article
describing the history of the Chinese corporate legal system, that
professor Fang clearly favors the "system" (if there was one) before
the centralization and regularization process began. Fang's Article
suggests that in the early stages there were fewer mandatory rules and
regulations than exist today, and that most of the rules were elective
rather than mandatory. The fact that professor Fang appears to be
very critical of the application of the mandatory rules throughout his
Article seems to suggest that the earlier system was better.3 Fang's
Article thus implies that life was easier with no rules. This implica-
tion is both simplistic and naive. Furthermore, the Article attributes
the apparent disparity between the old and new systems to a
perceived unreasonable man-a person who has established a
universal model to be applied to any situation without considering the
context.4 Among the more serious atrocities committed by this
unreasonable man are:
(1) the establishment of one prophetic criterion against
which the successfulness of the corporatization experiment
is to be evaluated-namely, whether or not "public owner-
ship" (which, in China, refers to the system of state and
collective ownership) was strengthened. Even today, public
ownership or state ownership carries a connotation of
political correctness.'
(2) The retroactive application of laws, regulations, and
impetuous policy changes to companies that were established
long before the promulgation of the same laws and regula-
tions.6
2. Id. at 152-55.
3. Id. at 265-66.
4. Id. at 152-55.
5. Id. at 156.
6. Id. at 162-63, 169-71.
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(3) The hair-splitting division of power (hence, tangible
interests) among the various government ministries, as well
as central and local governments and business entities.7
(4) The unconstitutional, and ultra vires, delegation of power
by the State Council to the State Council Securities Policy
Commaittee (SCSPC) with regard to the formulation of
securities-related laws and regulations, and to the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) with regard to its
regulatory and enforcement power.'
(5) The establishment of a draconian agency-the CSRC-
with extensive regulatory power that is neither subject to the
checks and balances of the administrative appeal nor the
judicial review process.'
(6) The creation of a public offering approval system that
stands on its own head, primarily because of Catch-22-type
requirements for companies aspiring to issue shares to the
public. The system also purportedly predetermines candi-
dates, a practice that vitiates any necessity for a system of
approval based on merit or quality of a company.'0
(7) The creation of a listing approval system that gives de
facto approving power to the CSRC without subjecting it to
any liabilities."
(8) The institution of a wasteful, inefficient, unfair and
irrational lot drawing (plus mandatory underwriting) system
for public offerings that promotes gambling; a system that
deprives the company of capital as potential investors spend
money on lottery tickets that could otherwise go to the
company. The lottery system also forces new investors to
pay unreasonably high prices for their new shares."
(9) The institution of an ineffective and anti-market stock-
offering quota system. 3
(10) The unreasonable, controversial, and self-serving
mandatory use of legal, accounting and other professionals
7. Id. at 166-69.
8. Id. at 171-78.
9. Id. at 177, 236, 237,263.
10. Id. at 181-86.
11. Id. at 186.
12. Id. at 187-97.
13. Id. at 196-97.
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as a part of the approval system-a practice that creates
conflict of interests and encourages corruption. 4
(11) The artificial classification of company stocks by virtue
of their holders' legal status as opposed to the intrinsic
characteristics of the stocks themselves."
(12) The irrational permission given to the promoters of the
company to subscribe to the company stock at a substantially
lower price than that for the general investing public.1 6
(13) The false assumption that the division of power
between ownership and management, resulting from
corporatization, could lead to a more efficient economic
system (and that freedom of contract is thus infringed
upon).17
I could add more to this list, but the absurdity of the unreason-
able man is sufficiently exemplified in the above. I will try to respond
to these critical comments in the rest of this Article.
II. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
The question of whether the corporatization experiment serves
to preserve and (or) strengthen "public ownership" in China has
indeed-been one of the key concerns of the leadership of the country,
as well as regulators, professionals, and scholars. Anyone remotely
connected to the process recognizes this fact and can see that the
short history of the experiment has been characterized by several
pendulous swings in both the political and economic arena.
It was only three years ago, in 1992, when China's patriarch Deng
Xiao-Ping made his famous southern tour calling for a "deepening of
reform" and said that the stock market "experiment" should be
permitted. At that time, Mr. Deng also stated his rationale for the
experimentation: "we can always close it if it does not prove to be
conducive to our socialist market economy." Deng's words have been
quoted several times by some of the most conservative party leaders
who view the stock markets as a negative influence. This faction
wishes to restrict the growth of China's securities industry, as part of
an overall effort to retreat from the privatization process, because it
14. Id. at 197-98.
15. Id. at 199-212.
16. Id. at 193-96.
17. Id. at 263-65.
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is one of the major components of China's current economic reform
program. It is worth mentioning that the conservative forces, which
just a few years ago were a formidable faction in the Chinese
leadership, are dying out and have now been reduced to a whisper.
During the years since 1978-a period of reform and one marked
by a rather liberal open-door policy-there have been significant
incongruities between official policy and practice. This stems from a
political environment where leaders have to be cautious about
implementing new reform measures, if they wish to maintain their
political well-being. Frequently, what is stated does not necessarily
indicate the true belief of the policy makers at the time, but is
necessary in order to implement the true reform measure. This
approach basically assumes that the means justify the ends. Such
tactics are a reflection of strategic and tactical compromises at
particular historical junctures. The adoption of the so-called "public
ownership" criterion is just another example of such historical
compromise.
To most people involved in the process the political ramifications
of the stock market experiment have become more or less irrelevant.
This is due to the proclamation, by Mr. Deng (the ultimate designer
of the party policies) that it is best to postpone the great debate over
the wisdom of adopting a short-term capitalistic approach versus a
socialist approach and leave it to future generations. The most
important reason given by Mr. Deng to support this policy decision
is' an economic one. This decision was made in the hope that
economic growth can be maintained at a level at which the social and
economic problems that are a direct result of reform can be con-
trolled, or, better yet, solved.
Some of the more obvious and threatening issues that have
emerged during the reform process include the cleavages between the
central and local governments, the growing disparity between the rich
and the poor, and corruption. For these and other reasons, it has
become almost a habit for policy makers, especially more liberal
officials, to justify their policies by citing politically correct concepts,
rather than addressing the substantive issues. After a while, such
debate is no longer a pretence but becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy
for the Party and the State. These issues, compounded by the
necessity for policies that promote continued economic growth, pose
serious concerns for any leader in a society as geographically and
demographically enormous and as economically and educationally
destitute. One is constantly reminded of the two thousand year old
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Chinese saying that "the fear of the state is not poverty, but inequali-
ty." Although any modem Chinese leader would like to keep
solutions simple and make life easy for everyone, the political issue
of the distribution of wealth is never more than just a few blocks
away. The handling (and "mouthing," so to speak) of this and related
issues, therefore, will always require great political dexterity.
M. RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS
The retroactive application of laws, regulations, and government
policies has occurred throughout Chinese history. Under the current
regime, it was a practice that was often applied until the end of the
Cultural Revolution (1976). Even though there is strong antagonism
towards the practice of retroactive application as a modem legal
concept, the question is not readily acknowledged in the Chinese
constitution. While most members of the legal circle recognize the
invalidity of this practice, it is still applied on occasion. While it is an
important issue, it should not have been raised in the context of
Fang's Article, because it is simply not a problem. Fang's Article,
moreover, uses the term "retroactive" incorrectly.
The first example Fang's Article cites concerning retroactivity is
the retroactive application of the Company Law. The State Commis-
sion for Restructuring the Economic System (SCRES), the State
Assets Management Bureau (SAMB), the People's Bank of China
and, later, the CSRC, joined hands in determining the legality of joint
stock companies that were incorporated before May 1990.18 Those
"companies that existed legally before 1990, indeed which had been
encouraged by local governments to form, found themselves bound by
decrees that subsequently came into force."' 9 This, according to
Fang, plunged the issuing companies and shareholders into unforesee-
able legal risks.'
Fang's Article then paints a more horrendous picture where a
company has to go through various government agencies, each at a
different time, in order for the company's legality to be recognized.
Fang's Article suggests that this made it necessary for the issuer and
the professionals working for the company to forge documents since
18. Id. at 162.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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no one could have possessed the foresight to know what today's legal
requirements would be.2'
From the point of view of someone who has been either closely
observing or directly involved in the process, it is obvious that Fang's
Article is confusing the issues involved. First of all, the so-called
determination issue was not to establish the legality of those
companies incorporated before a certain date-which, in fact, is
December 1990, rather than May 1990-but rather the authenticity of
the applicants who claim to have been incorporated before that date
in order to take advantage of a pronounced state policy that grants
priority to pioneer companies for listing on the stock exchanges. As
for those companies that have been screened out during this process,
their legality to exist and to do business with limited liability has
never been threatened. The truth of the matter is, from a purely legal
point of view, the Chinese legal system never provided those
companies with a possible venue to get listed on a big trading board
(although it did not prohibit the buying and selling of their shares
through other more discreet mechanisms). Thus, the shareholders
bought their shares with an assumed risk, and presumed knowledge,
that the trading of their shares, if possible at all, would be limited to
certain venues.
One has to bear in mind the fact that the two stock exchanges,
Shanghai and Shenzen, were only opened on an "experimental" basis
in December 1990. At that time, a total of thirteen companies were
listed, eight in Shanghai and five in Shenzhen. By mid-1990, the
People's Bank of China and SCRES had issued several ordinances
prohibiting local governments from allowing more companies to
incorporate locally. This move put both the companies and their
shareholders on notice that a more stringent, centralized incorporation
and listing policy was on the way.
This policy of favoring the pioneers and thus discriminating
against the "late-comers" is especially clear if one looks at the price
differential between the Initial Public Offering (IPO) and the time of
a given company's listing (an entirely different issue to be dealt with
later in this Article). This differential led to a "gold rush" by all the
companies, real or fake, to get listed. An opinion exists that the
policy should have allowed everyone to get on board, so as to
eliminate any necessity to cheat. As a macro-economic policy this
could have been implemented in the 1950s, and the market might be
21. Id. at 193-98.
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so mature today that we would not need to worry about the possible
repercussions of "shock therapy" anymore. Unfortunately, this issue
was not at the top of Mao's agenda, and obviously it is too late now
to discuss that possibility. If we simply allowed everyone to jump on
board, the boat would sink with everyone on it.
Let us look at a few facts concerning Shanghai and Shenzen, the
world's youngest stock exchanges:
* 296 listed companies as of April 1995
* more than 360 products trading
* daily trading volume reached over RMB 18 billion
(approximately U.S. $2 billion)
* weekly trading volume over RMB 60 billion at the
exchanges' peak swing
It took Japan and Hong Kong more than twenty years, and
Korea and Taiwan more than thirty years, to -reach these levels.
Criticism of the government has been pouring in for allowing too
many companies to get listed, thus diluting the thin capital market.
The market regulators, meanwhile, are contemplating the tempo of
IPO approvals, having to answer questions from both the market and
planning-oriented factions. It has been suggested time and again by
the professional regulators that the vetting function should be left to
the stock exchanges to perform, and the State Council has been
considering that option. However, the possible delegation of that
power was made much more difficult by the Company Law whih
requires approval of not only all public offerings but also all listings
of public companies by the State Council Securities Regulatory
Agency. The most important reason given by the law makers for that
provision is that the exchanges are no better than any of the
government agencies, because they are regarded as part of the local
governments and act in the provincial interests of the localities rather
than the overall long-term interests of the general investing public.
It is also worth noting that SCRES and CSRC made their
decisions concerning the authenticity of the so-called pre-1991 joint-
stock companies primarily on the basis of historical documents filed
with SCRES in late 1990 by the local governments for statistical
purposes (more or less on a voluntary basis). For some of the local
governments to now claim that there should have been more of those
companies filed with SCREs is not only unfair to most other localities,
but also would open the door to forgery and deception at a time when
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a determination in the affirmative could mean a windfall of tens of
millions of yuan for the company.
IV. DIVISION OF POWER
Fang's Article indicates three sets of problems with regard to the
division of power in the regulation of the companies and the securities
market: (1) the turf battle among the central government ministries;
(2) the tug of war between the central and local governments; and (3)
the inappropriate delegation of the government's power to indepen-
dent professional firms.
For those who have been working in the field, the competition
for power among the different government agencies has been very
much a way of life since the beginning. The same holds true for the
corporate world in China. An unfortunate result of this phenomenon
is the fact, that due to either ignorance or turf wars among agencies,
the Company Law does not address the whole issue of overlapping
and conflicting systems of approval and enforcement authorities as
recognized by the now-defunct experimental system. The Company
Law leaves the issue of overlapping approvals in a rather nebulous
state, by not specifying the appropriate authorities in instances where
it should. The securities regulations have similar, if not more serious,
problems due to certain historical reasons-in fact, the necessary
consensus for the opening of the stock market would never have been
achieved without compromises made among certain historically
powerful government agencies. Fortunately, these kind of inadequa-
cies may still have a chance of being remedied through the pending
Securities Law.
As for the conflicts between the central and local governmental
regulatory agencies with regard to division of power, compromises
similar to that at the central level were also made to the local govern-
ments. This was not due mainly to the failure to recognize the
necessity to centrally regulate the market, but rather a reluctance to
alienate the local governments especially at a time of experiment that
has contributed to the present growth of regionalism.
Competition is inherent in any power structure. I know of no
legal system in history that does not contain some- possibility for
factional/bureaucratic in-fighting. More bureaucratic in-fighting can
be expected in a system that has recently been created from an
obsolete yet elaborate predecessor. The present corporate and
securities regulatory framework in China allows too many different
forces into play, making it a cumbersome, inefficient, and frequently
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confusing system. Part of the problem can be attributed to the innate
nature of bureaucracy; whereas in other respects it is simply the work
of necessity, that is, measures taken in order to pacify different
bureaucratic forces that feel threatened by the deepening stages of the
reform.
The third problem addressed by Fang's Article with regard to
division of power is really a matter of varying conceptions. Profes-
sional services such as those offered by law firms and accounting firms
are universally regarded as necessary for the protection of various
interests involved in the public offerings of corporate securities. It is
therefore a mandatory requirement for the issuers of corporate
securities to hire professional firms (and pay them hefty fees!), either
as a matter of investors' demand or as a matter of statutory obliga-
tion. In the case of statutory requirement, it may very well function
like an approving authority since without such professional opinions,
the offering could be blocked. However, such a requirement is not
generally regarded as a governmental function, but rather a market
function. The fact that there are now hundreds of legal and account-
ing firms in China licensed to provide securities-related services for
foreign listings also refutes Fang's claim that the only purpose of this
statutory requirement is to create jobs for lawyers.
V. ULTRA VIRES DELEGATION OF POWER
If one tries to argue along political lines, as I have in the
preceding paragraphs, the law becomes somewhat of a tangential
issue. So argued, the law is but the reflection of factional or collective
political will. This problem has a very different connotation as
portrayed in Fang's Article: in Fang's Article, the political dimension
is given definite legal status, and Fang appears to argue along the
lines of constitutional power.
First, Fang's Article questions the authority of the SCSPC to
formulate and draft securities-related laws and regulations. Fang's
Article argues that this task should be left to the National People's
congress (NPC), China's highest legislative body.
In the 1960s, the NPC delegated the promulgation of economic
related laws to the State Council. Fang believes that the State
Council does not possess the authority to further delegate such
powers as in the case of the SCSPC with respect to the promulgation
of securities-related regulations. Fang's argument has no logical
foundation and no basis in reality. The State Council delegates the
drafting of regulations to the relevant ministries and government
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entities responsible for the particular section or industry. Recent
examples of such practice include the promulgation of Regulations for
Establishing Foreign Investment Companies, the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the Guidelines for
Foreign Investment by Sector, State Planning Commission.
In China, it is not uncommon for laws and regulations of first
instance to be approved by the State Council without being passed by
the NPC. While this issue presents a constitutional dilemma, it has
never been challenged in the courts or questioned by the NPC (or
anyone for that matter). Through its actions, the NPC has acquiesced
to the authority of the State Council. As the issue of separation of
power emerges in China's political structure, this may become an area
of serious political debate. At this time, however, it is not.
Second, Fang's Article demands an answer for the delegation of
governmental power (or the lack thereof) to the CSRC, which is
presumably not a government administrative agency but rather a non-
administrative organization under the aegis of the government.
The CSRC was established as the administrative, supervisory, and
enforcement arm of the SCSPC. The CSRC does not have adminis-
trative status in name due to the urgent need for a regulatory body
at the time of its formation. The architects of China's securities
industry, both practitioners and policy makers alike, believed such a
step was necessary if the market was to have any hope of developing
in a healthy fashion. The current labelling of the CSRC is only that,
a label. In fact, the CSRC is in every other respect an administrative
body.
Fang's Article argues that as a result of the CSRC's labelling or
"status," the body is not subject to administrative appeal and the
judicial review process. While the CSRC has not been sued yet,
civilians possess the right to sue the CSRC and threaten to do so on
a daily basis. By the same token, the courts certainly have the
authority to overturn any decision made by the CSRC and, in fact,
have done so. A recent example of such a case was a decision made
by the Hainan High Court in total disregard of CSRC policy.
It is worth mentioning in this context that the securities regulato-
ry bodies in many other countries share similar status to that
possessed by the CSRC. Examples include England, Hong Kong, and
Italy, among others.
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VI. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, LISTING APPROVAL,
QUOTAS, AND THE NECESSITY OF PROFESSIONAL
PARTICIPATION
Fang's Article characterizes the application procedure for an
initial public offering as a process that is wholly unfair to the'
applicant. In fact, Fang claims that the process created through the
interim regulations forces companies and professionals to lie. The
Article contains a continuous stream of rhetoric regarding the process
that is both pedantic and long-winded, reflecting little knowledge of
the actual working process. While I could make extensive remarks in
this area, I have selected the two points that I believe deserve the
greatest attention.
First, I would like to address the importance of professionals.
Chinese regulations do in fact require professional documentation in
areas such as asset .evaluation, auditing reports, and legal opinions.
This practice is common in many other jurisdictions. Fang assumes
that these professionals are hired to provide an opinion before the
quota is granted to the applicant. In fact, the process involves give-
and-take between the potential applicants and the relevant authorities.
Only the companies that are short listed by the local government
would even contemplate engaging the services of professionals. For
Fang to accuse these parties of lying is pure imagination based on his
own logic rather than actual experience.
The same problem applies to Fang's accusation that the appli-
cants and underwriters sign an agreement before the company is
granted an issuing quota. No agreement is actually signed, or even
seriously contemplated by an underwriter or the company, until the
company is given its quota and granted permission to offer shares to
the public by the local government. The mandatory draft underwrit-
ing agreement exists for the following purposes: (1) to ensure that the
parties involved are acting in accordance with the law, and (2) to
ensure that the investors are clear regarding the relationship and
interest of all parties involved.
Fang's Article .correctly identifies a shortcoming in the listing
approval process, but misconstrues both its origin and intention.
Currently, a company that wants to make an IPO needs an accompa-
nying listing approval. This rule makes it impossible for any company
to issue shares without being listed on a stock exchange. This rule
came into existence due to excessive concern for black market trading
RESPONSE TO FANG LIUFANG
of shares that was a common phenomenon at the time the rule was
introduced in 1993.
VII. LOTTERY SHARE DISTRIBUTION METHOD
The lottery system was established in 1990 after the exchanges
were operational for close to a year. The system was implemented as
a measure to solve one of the problems common to an emerging
market in a state such as China: simply put, "crowd control." At the
time the system was introduced, demand for new shares far out-
stripped supply, leading to illicit practices in share distribution at the
time of IPO.
Prior to the establishment of the lottery system, subscribers with
direct access to the company issuing shares would purchase large
portions of the initial shares and resell them at a tremendous profit,
thus depriving the public of direct access. In an ideal marketplace
such profit making would be allowed. However, since such profit
making in China would be attributable to monopolistic conditions, the
continued existence of such a system would only perpetuate a
monopolistic situation that is patently unfair to investors. The lottery
system was established in an effort to level the playing field among
initial investors.
The lottery system had some inherent flaws from the outset. One
of the more serious problems associated with the lottery system was
the hoarding of tickets. Such practice certainly did not promote the
goal of achieving greater investor access and equality at the time of
an IPO. In an effort to further refine the system, the practice of
depository certificates was introduced. The certificates discouraged
speculators from purchasing vast quantities of lottery tickets, because
they had to have a bank deposit ranging from RMB 250-500 for each
slip. Such a practice is unappealing to speculators because it reduces
cash in hand. For Fang's Article to refer to the lottery system as a
gambling contract with no foreseeable future represents a shallow and
inaccurate analysis. Fang's Article is correct to say that a problem did
exist as a result of the local governments' practice of grouping
companies together for the lottery and restricting the number of
tickets. The CSRC remedied this situation by prohibiting the latter
practice in the Interim Regulations; the former practice was eventual-
ly prohibited through verbal warnings.
Fang's Article aside, Americans have often levied criticism at the
Chinese for the institution of a lottery system, a criticism that is
inappropriate given the current circumstances in China. The criticism
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of the lottery system stems from a prevailing opinion in the United
States, and elsewhere, that book-building (or free-pricing) is a better
means of pricing and distributing shares at the time of an IPO. For
the time being, the practice of book-building cannot be employed in
China for the following reason: as a result of the quota system, the
company would enjoy a monopoly in share distribution, and such a
situation would cause great distortion in the price at time of the IPO.
This practice would be both unfair to the investors, and would not be
conducive to development of a mature market mentality. We will all
be happy to see China's securities industry reach a stage where the
quota and lottery systems can be abolished in favor of practices such
as book building, but market development is a process.
VIII. SHARE CLASSIFICATION
The classification of ordinary shares in China was ordained by no
one and is a system that was developed more or less by default.
Indeed, the system of privatization in China is a process and must be
recognized as such. In this process, we are transforming companies
that were established under one system, that of state ownership, and
trying to privatize these entities.
Classification of ordinary shares is a temporary measure that will
evolve as the system progresses. While there is some legitimacy to
the criticism levied in Fang's Article, it is necessary to examine the
reasons for the development of such a system as justification for its
existence.
At the outset of the privatization process policy makers from a
variety of government agencies did not consider the long-term
ramifications of share classification. In fact, in discussing the early
stages of the process it would be inappropriate to say that there was
any collective consideration given to the development of the privatiza-
tion process-it was indeed haphazard. In devising such a plan, the
government failed to realize the fact that in order to maintain control
of the state assets of the enterprises it was not necessary to make a
portion of the shares non-tradable.
At present, the classification of shares is no longer an important
issue subject to major debate. There is almost universal agreement
that such a system should not exist; the problem lies in what the
secondary market is able to tolerate. In the current environment,
both political and marketplace stability represent the top priorities for
the central authorities in China during this "succession" phase. Until
the political transition surrounding the death of Deng Xiao-Ping is
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complete, central authorities will not allow any measures that may
cause turmoil in the marketplace, or elsewhere, to be introduced.
Until the succession phase passes, one should not expect any major
changes that could potentially affect social stability.
IX. INITIAL INVESTORS' ADVANTAGE
Fang's Article has expressed grave concern over the issue of
promoters' shares. It is true that the promoters "purchase" shares at
a lower price than the investing public at the time of an IPO. Fang's
Article clearly does not recognize such practice is universally accepted
and has been established for very good reasons.
The risks assumed by the promoters are far greater than those
incurred by the investing public. This fact holds true both historically
and at the time of the public offering. Comparatively speaking,
promoters in China are somewhat disadvantaged due to the existence
of a number of rules that favor the investing public.
First, only companies with a profit-making record of three or
more years are allowed to issue shares to the general public. That
fact, coupled with the auditing rule that goodwill (reputation) of a
going concern is not allowed to be calculated into the value of the
company, leaves the initial investors (the promoters) with only one
option to realize their gain for the risk taken: selling the company as
a going concern rather than at its book value.
Second, the Company Law requires the promoters of a publicly
traded company to refrain from selling their shares for at least three
years from the date of public offering. Presumably, such a measure
is meant to give the investing public greater confidence in the
company.
Furthermore, the promoters' advantage is a natural function of
the marketplace. In China the promoters do possess a certain
advantage as a result of short supply, primarily due to the temporary
quota system. It should not be forgotten that in almost all newly
developed markets, demand always outstrips supply. It is only fair
that the promoters be permitted to sell their company at a price
higher than book value. If the promoters did not possess such an
advantage, little incentive would exist for enterprises to transform
themselves into share holding companies.
X. SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
Fang's Article questions the wisdom of China's current policy
that attempts to separate the ownership from the management of a
1995]
286 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:271
company. The most efficient companies, Fang argues, are the Taiwan
and Hong Kong family owned and operated companies. Fang's
Article suggests freedom of contract and abolition of excessive and
wanton government interference as a solution for the non-efficient
companies. While I do not purport to be an expert in either
economics or business administration, I would like to respond simply
in terms of historical logic and the virtue of the law.
Fang's Article claims that the separation of ownership and
management has failed to produce greater efficiency, and is not
necessarily an appropriate structure for Chinese companies. Fang's
Article cites examples of ten listed companies that have not per-
formed well as joint-stock companies. The foundation of his
argument being that the transformation has brought about little
change in management style. Fang's Article thus insinuates that these
companies reflect the management and performance situation of all
joint-stock companies, vitiating the necessity of establishing joint-stock
companies.
Fang's Article states that all the institutionalized rules and habits
embodied in the SOEs have been incorporated into the joint-stock
companies. While there may be some residual rules and habits that
carried over from the former system into the newly formed entities,
Fang should recognize that such a transformation is a process, and
that this process takes time. It seems only logical that companies that
were established as private entities from the outset stand in an
advantageous position because the ownership-management question
was settled from the beginning. However, those companies making
the transition should be commended for their efforts. Not only that,
but the numbers show that several of the listed companies are indeed
performing quite well. Further, even those companies that are not
doing well are forced to report their performance accurately, and are
made accountable to their shareholders. If the shareholders do not
like what they see, there is no law preventing them from selling their
shares.
Fang's criticism of wanton and excessive interference on behalf
of the government is irrelevant to the management/ownership
question. Of course, everyone, including the government, denounces
excessive and wanton interference in the management and operation
of SOEs. In fact, authorities are obsessed with the issue of reforming
SOEs and making them self-sufficient independent operators that
respond to the needs of the marketplace. For the past fifteen years
the government has been moving in this direction; in more recent
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years the pace has been accelerated. I must emphasize the point
again, that the transformation of a system, inclusive of all sectors, that
is wholly based in state ownership to one that functions by the rules
of the marketplace, takes time and effort. China's efforts to promul-
gate a bankruptcy law are a further indication of the seriousness of
intent. Likewise, the enactment of the State Owned Industrial
Enterprise Law, reduces the government's level of interference in
enterprise management to an absolute minimum. Also, as China
prepares to enter the World Trade Organization it will be forced to
quicken the pace of enterprise reform in order to compete in a
barrier-free trade regime.
As far as the issue of family ownership and management is
concerned, let us recall the origins of China's current regime. One of
the more important objectives (and a reason for the success of the
Chinese revolution in 1949) was to overthrow a feudalistic society
where a few corrupted families controlled the economic (and political)
lifelines of the whole country. The ensuing socialist movement to
nationalize the economy greatly boosted the morale of the masses, as
well as the efficiency of the companies for a period of time. The
establishment of a national system of state ownership proved to be a
temporary solution, pulling China out of a very difficult period.
However, this solution is no longer appropriate in such a comprehen-
sive fashion. It is crippling the reform of the financial sector (a top
priority of the State) and is costing the state vast sums of money to
maintain. If a country has already experienced (or perceived to have
experienced) so much hardship and disillusionment under other
systems, it is only natural that it would want to experiment with
something new. Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that Deng
Xiao-Ping initiated an economic revolution, along with its policy of
separating ownership from management.
Since China's demographic and geographic vastness does not
allow the experiment to proceed too rapidly, it would seem logical to
start reducing total control of the economy by the government in an
incremental manner. This is the rationale for the current pace of the
policy to separate ownership from management.
XI. CONCLUSION
Fang's Article does not prove to my satisfaction that the present
corporate and securities legal system is as problematic as the Article
would have us believe. What is more significant is that Fang is either
unwilling or perhaps unable to enlighten us with an alternative
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solution under the present circumstances. One should not make
general sweeping criticisms of an elaborate system without first
familiarizing oneself with the system and taking into consideration all
the relevant circumstantial factors. This is especially true when one
considers the fact that the system is still being established and that it
will necessarily undergo many changes in the years to come.
